and the United States—as well as the United
Nations Development Programme, the
required funding for the project has been
raised. The Azerbaijan National Agency or
Mine Action UXO team, with a capacity
of 11 UXO operators, launched the project 13 December 2005. ANAMA instructors joined with United States European
Command (USEUCOM) specialists to  
train an additional 36 UXO operators for
the same project at ANAMA’s Regional
Office in Khanlar (UXO team capacity
within ANAMA was created with the support of USEUCOM in 2002).
Abandoned ammunition storage clearance. In describing the problem of ERW,
the threat of abandoned ammunition is also
significant. When researching information
on the subject of abandoned ammunition,
cases can be found in Nigeria, Albania and
Kuwait, but thus far minimal information
describing Azerbaijan’s abandoned ammunition problem is available. The Soviet warehouse in Agstafa can provide an additional
case for better understanding the threat of
abandoned ammunition and the challenges
that groups like ANAMA face in order to
clear this type of ERW.
The task for abandoned Soviet munition
storage clearance in Agstafa is very complicated and dangerous for several reasons:
• The occurrence of “ammunition
spreads” in which different types of
ammunition are mixed and scattered
throughout the area
• The presence of degraded flechette
and fragmentation ammunition,
which consist of small projectile darts
and shrapnel that are hazardous and
not immediately identifiable
• The presence of white phosphorus,
which ignites when exposed to air
• Incorrect or misleading marking
of UXO

Taking into account that 15 years have
passed since the warehouse explosion, clearance of this ammunition is a complicated—
yet extremely important—task.
In addition to planned clearance projects such as these mentioned, ANAMA
also provides rapid response to mine/UXOrelated emergencies. When one Agstafa
scrap-metal workshop set up by locals
exploded approximately 200 metres (219
yards) from a residential area, the workshop
itself was totally destroyed and, according
to official information by local authorities,
three people were killed and 23 injured.
Additionally, the explosion damaged houses
as far as three kilometres (two miles) from
the workshop. Immediately following the
explosion, ANAMA established a team of
UXO operators to carry out emergency
marking and clearance operations in the
incident area. Operations lasted for one
month and as a result, 170,000 square metres (42 acres) of land were cleared and
more than 5,007 items of UXO (among
them 1,261 pieces containing white phosphorous) were removed from the area
and destroyed. ANAMA has continued
to react quickly to any mine- and UXOrelated emergencies.
Conclusion
As the Japanese might say, “Tada yori
takai mono wa nai” (“We have to pay much
more for something we got free of charge”).
It is important to figure out how to solve the
existing problem of UXO and abandoned
ammunition and how to protect ourselves
from ERW in the future. Human beings
created the problem—dropping the bombs
and abandoning the ammunition “for free”
on Azerbaijan—and now they must correct
it at great cost by cleaning up the country
and making it safe again.
See Endnotes, page 109
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Mines Advisory Group, in partnership with CEIA USA, will sponsor a 423-kilometre (263-mile)
bike trek across Death Valley, USA. Event organizers hope to raise nearly £40,000 (US$74,000)
to support mine-action efforts around the globe.
From 4–11 March 2007, 40 participants will travel and cycle to raise money and awareness. The
registration fee for the event is only £175 ($325), but each participant is asked to raise
£2,750 ($5,100) in sponsorships, half of which will cover the cost of running the event.
Included in trek costs are London-to-Las Vegas airfare, accommodations, nearly all meals,
the use of bicycles and other sundry expenses.

The author discusses the challenges of protecting aid workers riding in
traditional unarmoured vehicles from the dangers of explosive remnants of
war. He offers some practical, after-market solutions that provide a high level
of protection for much less than the cost of traditional armoured vehicles.
by Thomas Hvidtfeldt [ Scanfiber Composites A/S ]

Effect from fragmenting mine on a vehicle. Here a car’s steel-plate body was ruptured by fragments
from a small hand grenade.

Side Protection and Seat Protection is one product that offers protection from roadside bombs.
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F

ollowing a conflict, humanitarian organisations are generally
the first to enter a country to deliver aid and start to rebuild
the country’s infrastructure. Aid workers often rely on a 4x4
sport-utility vehicle to transport supplies and people. This type of
carrier is viewed as a big, strong vehicle with high mobility, but it offers little protection against landmines and other explosive remnants
of war. It is what is known as a “soft vehicle.”
The term ERW is very wide and covers anything from handgun
ammunition to aircraft bombs.1 The majority of injuries, however, are
caused by devices like anti-personnel landmines, anti-tank mines and, as
seen recently in Lebanon, air-dropped submunition “bomblets.” Apart
from being the most numerous, AP mines are directed against people
on foot and are normally designed to explode following a relatively small
impact—often by the pressure of a foot or the tripping of a wire.
At the same time, small- or large-calibre gun ammunition, aircraft bombs and mortar rounds tend to be more stable—although
when they do explode, the results can be much more devastating.

The extent to which AP mines endanger passengers in a softskinned SUV depends heavily upon which type of device we’re
talking about. We can separate the various devices into two groups
depending on their primary kill mechanism:
• Blast ammunition works by creating a powerful blast wave
that destroys objects in close proximity to the explosion.
• Fragmenting ammunition works by creating a cloud of highvelocity steel fragments intended to inflict as much damage as
possible to anything or anyone in the surrounding area.
Most AP mines inflict injury primarily through the blast effect
and normally detonate by pressure. The effect from the blast wave
decreases rapidly with distance and it is often a “one kill” weapon.
On the other hand, some AP mines and many types of air-dropped
bomblets work with fragmentation as the primary kill mechanism.
The same goes for almost all mortar rounds and artillery ammunition. Contrary to a blast wave, which loses its power very quickly,
the high-density fragments surrounding the explosives maintain

For more information on this trip, visit www.magclearsmines.org.
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their energy for much longer
and can inflict injury quite far
away from the explosion. Due
to this extended range, most
types of fragmenting AP
mines have the option of tripwire detonation, which enables
the mine to go off when a person or vehicle trips a wire up to
10 metres (33 feet) away.
A person is at risk in two different ways while travelling in
an SUV. If the vehicle detonates
an AP device that works primarily through blast, the distance from
the expected impact point (below
a wheel) to the person in the vehicle
is normally high enough to create a safe
distance. However, if the device creates
fragments, the thin steel of the car body
will offer almost no protection against the
high-velocity steel fragments. The standard
car-body steel is 0.8 millimetre (0.03 inch)
thick and will not prevent fragments from
entering into the cabin.
To express it another way, when we are
talking about various AP devices, the main
concern for passengers in a vehicle is fragmentation rather than the shock or blast effect from the explosive.
For that reason, in an area with a high
risk of setting off fragmenting AP ammunition, fully armoured SUVs are recommended. However, apart from being very
costly, excessively heavy and hard to obtain in sufficient numbers, fully armoured
SUVs tend to give the wrong impression
of the humanitarian workers—namely
that they are not willing to take the same
risks that the inhabitants must take on a
daily basis.
As an alternative to fully armoured vehicles, there are a number of retrofit solutions
on the market today that can provide a good
level of protection for passengers travelling
in soft-skinned vehicles. Although retrofitted vehicles do not provide the same level of
protection as factory-armoured SUVs, some
can work well against a large number of ERW
threats for about one-twentieth the price of
a fully armoured vehicle. Consequently, a
much higher number of vehicles—and thus
passengers—can be protected for the same
money. In addition, the retrofit solutions to
protect soft vehicles, like ballistic blankets
(described below), can be delivered quickly
and most can be installed in the field.
Built-in Ballistic Blankets
Most retrofit solutions to protect
SUVs are based on aramide fabric, such as
Twaron® or Kevlar®, which is the ballistic
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material used in most body armour. By using flexible armour, it is possible to design
solutions that fit into the curved interior and
floor of the SUV.
In terms of level of protection, flexible solutions using aramide on the interior
and floor of the vehicle generally represent
a lower level of protection than those found
on the sides of a factory-armoured SUV.
Ballistic blankets are available from several
sources and are a system of tailor-cut and
overlapping blankets that cover as much of
the interior of the vehicle as possible up to
the windows.3
Ballistic blankets offer a good level of
protection against fragments coming from
below or from the lower sides. They are installed below the carpet and inside the side
panels and doors and require a complete
stripping of the vehicle. After reinstallation, the interior of the vehicle looks the
same as before, with no visible signs of it
being protected.
The protection level of the blankets is
normally specified according to a North
Atlantic Treaty Organization standard
STANAG [Standardisation Agreement]
29202 and the standard level by most nongovernmental organizations is a level referred
to as 600 m/sec. It is not possible to connect
this level directly to any specific mine or
grenade as the actual conditions have an
enormous influence on the real threat.
However, a level of 600 m/sec can be directly compared to other means of protection; for instance, standard body armour
(without vest-insert plates) represents a level
of protection of 450 m/sec and contains only
about half the amount of ballistic material.
A passenger in a vehicle that hits fragmenting ERW is much better off if the vehicle is
equipped with ballistic blankets than if he
is wearing body armour; in addition to a
higher ballistic level, the ballistic blankets
will offer protection of the extremities and
not only the torso.
Interestingly, compared to a fully armoured SUV,3 many soft-skinned vehicles
equipped with ballistic blankets are better
protected against landmines detonating on
the ground. The reason for this seeming inconsistency is because most armoured SUVs
are designed with a level of floor protection
according to an old German standard for
armoured limousines known as the “two
hand grenades” level. Unfortunately, the
specified grenade—the German type
DM51—is quite small and contains relatively small fragments that are easily stopped.
In addition to blankets, various systems
exist on the market to shield the passengers
from fragments.

Explosive Remnants of War and
Their Consequences
This article examines the post-conflict situation of Tajikistan, which has not only anti-personnel
Ballistic blankets.

New technologies with in-the-field armouring options can be fitted and removed
when there is no immediate danger. This
type of protection is designed to provide an
increased level of protection against ERW
and other weapons that explode next to
the vehicles. The increased availability of
these options improves the safety potential
for vehicles working in proximity to ERW.
In turn, these options and those developed
and implemented in the future will continue to better the working conditions of
personnel exposed to such risks.
See Endnotes, page 109

mines but various kinds of explosive remnants of war. Recently Tajikistan signed Protocol V1
of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons,2
which includes a commitment to clear the nation’s ERW.
The author highlights some of the different sources of
ERW in Tajikistan as well as the progress being made by
authorities to clear and destroy ERW.
A group of houses in close proximity to a mine danger zone.
ALL PHOTOS COURTESY OF CLEAR PATH INTERNATIONAL

by Jonmahmad Rajabov [ Tajikistan Mine Action Centre ]
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orldwide, landmines and unexploded
ordnance kill and maim approximately
20,000 people annually, one third of
them children.3
In recent years, the international community has
not paid serious attention to the risk posed by the UXO
problem (i.e., explosive ordnance that is used during
armed conflict but fails to detonate). It is impossible to
accurately count the number of uncleared mines and it
is also uncertain how much UXO remains. However, it
is believed the total number of items of UXO, no matter the type, greatly exceed the total number of mines.
UXO and other explosive items such as abandoned ordnance (all grouped together under the term explosive
remnants of war) continue to appear in huge numbers in
previous areas of conflict. Some countries, like Laos and
Vietnam, are more affected by UXO than mines.
Nowadays the international community is paying
more serious attention to the risks posed by the UXO
problem. This is reaffirmed by the adoption of Protocol
V to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons.
The adoption of Protocol V on 28 November 2003 was
possible thanks to governments acknowledging the seriousness of the post-conflict problems posed by UXO as
well as the necessity to minimize the risk and impact of
UXO. Tajikistan ratified Protocol V on 20 December
2005, and the Protocol entered into force for all parties on
12 November 2006. In accordance with the Protocol, the
term ERW encompasses UXO and abandoned explosive
ordnance in conflict areas. This Protocol obliges the conflicting parties, as well as States Parties, to be responsible

with regard to all UXO under their control. Tajikistan also has a landmine problem
and has ratified the Ottawa Convention.4 Together, these two documents stipulate
that after active military fighting ceases, countries should mark and clear the mines
as well as liquidate and destroy all mines and UXO under their control.
Impact of ERW in Tajikistan
In addition to the landmine problem, items of UXO also pose a great challenge
in Tajikistan. It is presumed that most ERW remains in the country due to the
civil war (1992–1997). The UXO in Tajikistan that remains on the ground is the
result of being fired from military planes and helicopters, as well as shelling. A
large number of Tajik citizens have consequently died or been seriously injured.
It is necessary to note that items of UXO also appear in the country for reasons
unrelated to war, including armed violence and attempted revolts. In Tajikistan,
as in many other countries, mandatory military service requires continued and
regular military training for the Armed Forces. It has been the case in Tajikistan
that during training, some shells have been fired and accidentally landed outside
the military training zone. These shells remain unexploded in areas where access
to the public remains open, putting the local population at risk.
Since the implementation of the Tajikistan Mine Action Programme, the manual mine-clearance teams and survey teams have found and destroyed more than
700 pieces of UXO. A majority of the ERW were found in the central region of
the country where fighting took place during the civil war. Until the ERW are removed from these areas, they will continue to pose a great risk to the population.
In Tajikistan, despite the ERW problem, civilians go about their daily business
and continue to find themselves in dangerous areas, at times receiving injuries.
For example, in February 2006, two teenagers—brother N. Yorov, 15, and sister
M. Yorova, 16, from Besimas village in Hissor district—were injured by a UXO
explosion while cutting wood. N. Yorov’s leg was seriously injured and his sister
received injuries to her stomach. Due to the lack of financial means, the family
was unable to provide necessary medical care for the teenagers, which has greatly
hampered their recovery. An investigation into the cause of this explosion revealed
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